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CLASSIC REVISITED:
PENAL THEORY IN PARADISE LOST
Jillisa Brittan *
Richard A. Posner**
PARADISE LOST. By John Milton. 1674. Reprinted in JOHN MILTON: COM-
PLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE. Edited by Meritt Y Hughes. New York:
MacMillan. 1985. Pp. xix, 1059.
INTRODUCTION
Milton's great poem can be enjoyed as a supernatural adventure story in
the epic tradition-indeed almost as a science-fiction fantasy. An incredibly
powerful supernatural figure-call him Father-lives on planet Heaven
somewhere in outer space, surrounded by lesser supernatural beings, called
Angels. Father begets Son asexually, and declares his intent to give him
viceregal authority. Infuriated at Son's being promoted over him, the fore-
most Angel, L leads a third of the Angels in violent rebellion against Father
and Son. At first it seems the rebels will best the loyal Angels. But Father
sends in Son to defeat the rebels all by himself. He succeeds effortlessly,
and packs them (now devils) all off to a dismal region of space, created by
Father to be the devils' Devil's Island, called Hell. Father, having lost a third
of his angels, and determined to complete L's humiliation, creates a new
planet and places on it an (initially) immortal couple that he's created out of
the dust on the planet's surface.
Father contrives to allow L to escape from Hell by choosing L's own
daughter, Sin, and his incestuously begotten son, Death, to guard the gates
of Hell so that L may travel through space to the new planet and there tempt
the couple to disobey the one prohibition that Father has laid upon them-
that they not eat the fruit of a mysterious tree. L succeeds in tempting them
(as Father had, in fact, foreseen, for he is omniscient), and for their disobe-
dience the couple is severely punished: they are deprived of immortality
and, together with their posterity and with the entire animal kingdom over
which they were to rule, they are condemned to lead a hard life, and then to
die. But upon Father's challenge to all the (remaining) Angels to figure out a
way to save the new race, Son offers to sacrifice himself to redeem them
eventually and so cap L's defeat. Father accepts the offer. We learn that in a
few thousand years he will impregnate a descendant of Eve with Son, so that
Son can be born a member of the race, and die, as otherwise there would be
* Mediator, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
** Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of
Chicago Law School.
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no sacrifice. As a result of his sacrificial death, the worthiest members of the
race will eventually become immortal companions of Father and Son (resur-
rected), like the Angels. The new planet will then be destroyed, Hell sealed
forever, and L utterly confounded.
So viewed, the poem is squarely in the epic tradition that, as in Homer,
depicts human beings as the playthings of the gods. In form, style, and even
certain narrative details, it is greatly indebted to the Homeric epics as well
as to later epics such as Orlando Furioso and The Faerie Queene. It tells the
heart-stopping story of a galactic power struggle between a tyrant fearful of
rebellion, determined to exact unquestioning obedience at any cost (the
great literary critic William Empson compared Father to Joseph Stalin'), and
a formidable rebel against the tyrant; and of the collateral damage that the
struggle inflicts on a hapless race. In the fairy-tale ending (projected be-
yond the end of the poem), the reader learns that all L's "malice serv'd but to
bring forth / Infinite goodness, grace and mercy shown / On man by [L] se-
duc't.' 3 Man will live in a "far happier place / Than this of Eden, and far
happier days" (XII, 464-65).
To tell such a story was not Milton's intention. He thought he was writ-
ing a theodicy in the form of a poem, rather than an adventure story, though
employing the idiom of epic. His conscious purpose, as he says at the outset
of the poem, was to "justify the ways of God to men" (I, 26). "God" is the
Christian God as understood by most English Protestants in the seventeenth
century. The "ways of God" that concern Milton are the events narrated in
the Bible and therefore accepted by him as historically accurate, together
with later accretions to the body of Christian beliefs. The key events are the
creation, and especially the Fall of man as narrated in Genesis, the story of
Jesus Christ as narrated in the Gospels, and the last judgment as narrated in
the Revelation of St. John (the Apocalypse). The Fall of man is sketched in
Genesis with extreme brevity; Milton elaborates it enormously to form the
core of Paradise Lost. But what is it exactly that Milton thinks needed to be
justified? It is the features of the Christian tradition that would strike a skep-
tic or other outsider to the tradition as inconsistent with a "modem"
conception of God. By "modern," we mean a conception that a person of
Milton's intellectual sophistication and moral character would consider
plausible. He would have considered neither ancient Greek and Roman
1. WILLIAM EMPSON, MILTON'S GOD 146 (1965).
2. Cf PHILIP PULLMAN, His DARK MATERIALS (2000) (a contemporary trilogy indebted in
more than its title to Paradise Lost, in which an epic battle rages across several worlds. On one side
are God (called "the Authority") and the Church, defending the principle of obedience to dogma; on
the other are those taking up the rebellion where Satan and the fallen angels left off, fighting for
what they consider to be the superior principles of knowledge and experience).
3. I, 217-19. All citations to Paradise Lost are to book and line numbers in the Hughes
edition.
4. Milton's choice of the Fall, rather than one of the other key biblical events, as the subject
for his epic, may have been due to the unique resonance that the Fall had for seventeenth-century
thinking about politics and to the sharpness with which it poses the question of individual freedom
versus obedience to authority. See CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE EXPERIENCE OF DEFEAT: MILTON AND
SOME CONTEMPORARIES 302 (Bookmarks 1994) (1984).
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polytheism nor the vindictive and jealous God of the Old Testament plausi-
ble. He would have insisted that God is perfect, meaning omnipotent,
omniscient (implying complete foreknowledge), and absolutely good-
infinitely loving and merciful, but also infinitely just. The task of justification
was, therefore, to show how the events of the Christian tradition, to which
Milton as a Christian was committed to believing as historical fact, could be
squared with the conception of God the perfect.
The theme of justification explains why many readers, including theologi-
ans, have found Paradise Lost "legalistic." There are no human laws in the
poem, but there is plenty of punishment-of the fallen angels, of Adam and
Eve and all their descendants, of the Son (who is going to be executed by the
Romans during his incarnation as a human being), of the hapless serpent, and
of the other animals (who become predator and prey after the Fall of man,
after having been vegetarian in the Garden of Eden). To be justified, punish-
ment must be shown to be the just consequence of a transgression. But that is
not to say that it must be the just consequence of a violation of positive law.
We have a conception of just punishment by parents for the transgressions
of children, though in our society (and in Milton's too), the punishment is
not a sanction having the force of law and the transgression is usually not a
violation of law. We can speak of justice within the family and similarly of
justice in the cosmic prelegal society depicted in Paradise Lost. And since
we are lawyers, punishment and justice will be the focus of this essay. Part I
explains the difficulty that Milton faced in reconciling a concept of just pun-
ishment with the characteristics that he ascribed to God, and how he tried to
resolve the difficulty by reference to free will. Part II examines the applica-
tion of his concept of just punishment to the specific punishments meted out
by God, identifying a retributive model for God's punishment of Satan and
the other fallen angels that has a secondary goal of deterring rebellion by the
still-loyal angels remaining in Heaven; a rehabilitative and deterrence model
for Adam, Eve, and their descendants; a strict liability model for the serpent;
but no intelligible rationale for the punishment of the other animals in Eden,
who were wholly uninvolved in the Fall.
I. GOD CONSTRAINED
The problem of justification is rendered acute by the difficulty of imag-
ining a deity who is at once omnipotent, omniscient, and absolutely good,
yet who at the same time inflicts what appear to be disproportionate, savage,
and gratuitous punishments. Any two of the deity's three traits can be com-
bined without difficulty. If God were omnipotent and omniscient, but not
good-rather, sadistic-the existence of excessive and gratuitous suffering
in the world that he created would not be puzzling. And likewise if he were
omniscient and absolutely good but not omnipotent (not the creator of all
things). And if he were omnipotent and absolutely good, but not omniscient,
then suffering might occur, even on a grand scale, by mistake. But when, as
in Paradise Lost, God is assumed to be omnipotent, omniscient, and
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absolutely good, the extent to which he permits and sometimes inflicts suf-
fering presents a considerable puzzle.
Life on earth, for most people and animals, is full of suffering. This sad
truth is presented in the poem, as in orthodox Christian theology, as the pun-
ishment for Adam's eating the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden. (Had
Eve alone eaten it, God would presumably have given Adam a substitute
wife, one who-warned by her predecessor's fate-would not have trans-
gressed.) It seems a disproportionate punishment, especially when Satan, in
the guise of the serpent, makes so compelling an argument for Eve's eating
the fruit and Adam makes so affecting a "case" for standing by Eve and
sharing her fate.
Satan explains to Eve that he ate the apple with no ill effect-on the
contrary, it enabled him, alone of all the animals, to learn to speak (and in as
rich a vocabulary as Adam and Eve). So God must have been fooling when
he said that to eat the fruit would bring death-and imagine what eating it
will do for the intellectual faculties of Eve, who already knows how to
speak. At worst, given Satan's plausible arguments, Eve is gullible not to
realize that the serpent might be lying to her (but who, in his or her prelap-
sarian inexperience, would expect an animal to lie or a devil to inhabit an
animal?). And at worst, Adam is uxorious in deciding to share Eve's fate by
eating the fruit also. For these rather trivial-seeming transgressions the suf-
fering experienced by billions of Adam and Eve's descendants (as Adam
puts it, -'in mee all / Posterity stands curst" (X, 817-18)), along with count-
less billions of animals, seems excessive.
Peculiarly gratuitous is the punishment of the serpent, condemned to
crawl on its belly. The punishment is fitting in Genesis because there the
serpent is the tempter. But in Milton's poem the serpent is not the tempter.
The creature was sleeping innocently when Satan entered through its mouth
and took it over. After tempting Eve, Satan leaves the serpent's body, and
presumably the serpent later wakes up and goes about its business oblivious
of the malign use to which its body has been put. The serpent is a victim,
not a wrongdoer, so why is it punished?
And why does the Son have to suffer being tortured to death on the cross
in order to enable some fraction of human beings (no animals) to be resur-
rected and thus, in a sense, compensated for their sufferings? Empson
thought there was an echo of human and animal sacrifice in the mode by
which God chose to redeem the human race.5 In sacrificial rites the sacrifice
is offered to the god in the hope that he will accept it. The Son offers him-
self as the sacrifice to God, and God accepts the offer.
The punitive events narrated in the poem are particularly disturbing, at
least to one not steeped in theology, because of God's foreknowledge, an
aspect of his omniscience. He knows that Lucifer will rebel and carry a third
of the other angels with him; he knows that Lucifer (as Satan) will tempt
Eve, precipitating the Fall of man-in fact, God arranges for Satan to escape
from Hell so that he can tempt her; he knows that billions of people will
5. EMPSON, supra note 1, at 241-47.
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suffer horribly as the result of the transgressions of the two human beings
whom he created; and he knows that his own Son will be tortured on the
cross. He foresees all these things with perfect serenity. It seems odd that
being omnipotent and absolutely good (loving, merciful), he did not arrange
to avoid these horrible events.
The explanation requires a careful analysis of what it means for God to
be absolutely "good," and an awareness of the supreme value that Milton's
God places on free will. To be good is to be loving and merciful, but also to
be just. The New Testament emphasizes the loving and merciful aspect of
God's absolute goodness, the Old Testament emphasizes God's justice, and
Milton's God combines both aspects. In the retributive theory of justice,
justice requires that a crime be requited by punishment. But a crime, in the
sense of a deed that justice requires be punished, is normally understood to
be a deliberate bad act, and an act is deliberate only if it is a product of free
choice, at least as Milton understood free choice. (An alternative under-
standing is that a free choice is simply a choice not constrained by certain
particularly powerful inducements, such as threatening to kill a person if he
doesn't hand over his wallet to the threatener.) God could have created man
to be incapable of committing bad acts, but man so constrained would not
have been sufficiently godlike to be worth creating as a substitute for the
fallen angels.
In other words, God faced a dilemma: he could make Eve a type of per-
son incapable of being persuaded by plausible arguments or Adam a type of
person who would have abandoned Eve to her fate. He could, in short, have
imbued both of them with a robotically inflexible instinct of obedience to
Father. But they would have been insipid creatures. As Adam, despite his
misgivings, says to Eve when she insists on spending some time by herself:
"Go; for thy stay, not free, absents thee more" (IX, 372). And when Adam
says, "Idleness had been worse" (X, 1055) than having to work after expul-
sion from the Eden, is there not a hint that an immortal race of vegetarian
nudists would lack a certain savor? Not that Milton would have acknowl-
edged such a heresy, even to himself; but artists do not create with only their
conscious mind or fully control their unconscious. Man was created "[s]uffi-
cient to have stood, though free to fall" (III, 99) because without freedom to
fall he would have had no will of his own.
We said that the three defining properties of the Christian God (omnipo-
tence, omniscience, perfect goodness) cannot be combined; and what we
have just seen is a slight buckling of divine omnipotence. God cannot be at
once perfectly just and perfectly merciful, because perfect justice excludes
mercy and perfect mercy excludes justice; nor can he create a worthy race
that will be perfectly obedient to him; nor can he save them in a way that
will preserve their freedom without sacrificing the Son. Adam himself notes
that some things are impossible even for God, when he says,
How can he exercise
Wrath without end on Man whom Death must end?
Can he make deathless Death? that were to make
Strange contradiction, which to God himself
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Impossible is held [to be], as Argument
Of weakness, not of Power. (X, 796-801)
Could God add two plus two and get five? Could he create a triangle whose
interior angles would add up to something different from 180 degrees? The
emphasis the poem places on the importance of divine punishment under-
cuts omnipotence. We punish those whom we do not otherwise control. We
must punish to exact obedience precisely because those whom we punish are
free to disobey. The distinctively "monarchical" punishment (in Michel
Foucault's sense) to which God subjects Satan reflects a typically monarchi-
cal anxiety about the ability to maintain order without extravagant displays
of power.6 No one who actually had absolute power would need to remind
his subjects of the fact.
The centrality of free will to just punishment and, therefore, Christian
theodicy is brought out in C.S. Lewis's brilliant exegesis of Paradise Lost,
where he reminds the reader that in St. Augustine's theology, as in Lewis's
own, everything that God creates is good by nature.7 God cannot (onipo-
tence buckling again) create something that is bad; that would be
inconsistent with his being absolutely good. Bad is simply the absence of
good, and the absence is caused by free choices made by creatures, such as
Lucifer, Adam, and Eve, that are good by nature. God creates the power of
choice, which is good, but that gift of power enables the recipient to decide
to be bad; all the blame falls on him or her, none on God.8
This analysis leaves a number of loose threads dangling. The punish-
ment of the serpent (and of the other animals) is hard to see as a dictate of
justice. The serpent has to be punished because Genesis said it was punished
and Milton is committed to Biblical inerrancy. But at the same time the ser-
pent has to be the tool of Satan, to be consistent with the overall structure of
the poem, in which Satan is the villain, not some reptile. Since the serpent is
the completely unknowing tool of Satan, it is not blameworthy and should
not be punished. (And how to explain God's having hardened the Pharaoh's
heart in Exodus, causing Pharaoh to make a disastrous error that results in
the death of all the firstborn children in Egypt?)
Also unclear is why Adam and Eve's descendants should be punished, or
why the punishment should include diseases, famine, and other disasters
that afflict the innocent (in the sense of people who have not brought disas-
ter on themselves by making bad choices) as well as the guilty. At these
points justification runs out, and the faithful have recourse to notions of di-
vine inscrutability, and specifically to the hope that everything that happens,
happens according to God's plan-a good plan, but we cannot know what it
is, and we must, therefore, suspend judgment. That is the approach taken by
other great works of religious literature, such as The Brothers Karamazov,
6. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 130 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage
Books 1979) (1975).
7. See C.S. LEWIS, A PREFACE TO PARADISE LOST 66-67 (1977).
8. Id.
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works that, unlike Paradise Lost, do not seek to justify God, to fit his actions
into a "legalistic" framework.
Such a fitting implies notions of proportionality. The punishment must
fit the crime. The crimes committed in Paradise Lost vary greatly, and like-
wise, as we now proceed to explain, the punishments.
II. GOD THE PUNITIVE
A. The Punishment of Satan and the Rebel Angels:
Retribution and General Deterrence
The first event narrated in Paradise Lost is a punishment, the punish-
ment of Satan and his followers for trying to overthrow the "Throne and
Monarchy of God" (I, 42):
Him the Almighty Power
Hurl'd headlong flaming from th' Ethereal Sky
With hideous ruin and combustion down
To bottomless perdition, there to dwell
In Adamantine Chains and penal Fire ....
A Dungeon horrible, on all sides round
As one great Furnace flam'd, yet from those flames
No light, but rather darkness visible
Serv'd only to discover sights of woe...
... torture without end .... (I, 44-48, 61-64, 67)
Milton ascribes this punishment to "Eternal Justice" (I, 70), but it is more
illuminatingly described as a demonstration of unlimited power: a demon-
stration to Satan, but also to the angels, both good and bad, that the ruler of
the universe is unconstrained by any limitations of time or space or physics
("from those Flames / No light, but rather darkness visible") or biology
(God later turns Satan and all the other devils into snakes). Hell is infinitely
deep ("bottomless"), eternal ("perdition"), unrelenting ("torture without
end"). Not only is it to continue forever; it is to get worse:
[Tihe will
And high permission of all-ruling Heaven
Left [Satan] at large to his own dark designs,
That with reiterated crimes he might
Heap on himself damnation, while he sought
Evil to others, and enrag'd might see
How all his malice serv'd but to bring forth
Infinite goodness, grace and mercy shown
On Man by him seduc't, but on himself
Treble confusion, wrath and vengeance pour'd. (I, 211-20)
There is even a hint that God's creating man was intended to shatter Sa-
tan's satisfaction in having taken so many angels with him from heaven:
[L]est his heart exalt him in the harm
Already done, to have dispeopl'd Heav'n,
1055April 2007]
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My damage fondly deem'd, I can repair
That detriment, if such it be to lose
Self-lost, and in a moment will create
Another World, out of one man a Race
Of men innumerable .... (VII, 150-55)
Satan has grounds for believing that God created Man from dust, rather than
from some more exalted substance, in order to spite Satan: "this new Favor-
ite / Of Heav'n, this Man of Clay, Son of despite, / Whom us the more to
spite his Maker rais'd / From dust" (IX, 175-78).
We are in the presence of Foucault's monarchical model of punishment.9
It is characterized by extravagantly cruel and protracted public punishments
designed to overawe the monarch's subjects by a display of unlimited power
over the subject's body. For besides subjecting Satan to the pains of Hell,
God has altered Satan's physique. Once the brightest angel in heaven, he is
now a hulking monster ("how chang'd / From him, who in the happy
Realms of Light / Cloth'd with transcendent brightness didst outshine / Myr-
iads though bright" (I, 84-87)). The "ritual marks of the vengeance" on his
body' ° are symbols visible to everyone of that unlimited monarchical power
that Hobbes thought the essential guarantor of social peace."
Interestingly, Satan is surprised by the ferocity of the punishments that
God has meted out to him and his followers. He had not realized that God
had the power or the inclination to punish him in this manner. In addressing
the fallen angels immediately after the Fall, he defends his decision to rebel
as rationally based on the information he had regarding God's past behavior
and the combined strength of himself and the rebel angels:
[W]hat power of mind
Foreseeing or presaging, from the Depth
Of knowledge past or present, could have fear'd
How such united force of Gods, how such
As stood like these, could ever know repulse? (I, 626-30)
Satan is complaining not merely about lack of notice of the punishment in
store for rebels against God, but, more disturbingly, of having been tricked
into rebelling by God's concealment of his power--God who "still his
strength conceal'd, / Which tempted our attempt, and wrought our fall" (I,
641-42)-when Satan had plausibly believed that God's authority rested
merely on his "old repute, / Consent or custom" (I, 639-40).
Had Satan had the full picture, he might not have rebelled. He would
have known that rebellion would fail and hideous punishments ensue. We
say "might," not "would" because there are indications that Satan's resent-
9. See FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 130; Wilma G. Armstrong, Punishment, Surveillance,
and Discipline in Paradise Lost, 32 STUD. ENG. LITERATURE 91, 95 (1992); Jillisa Brittan, The
Economics of Punishment in Milton's Paradise Lost 1-3 (Feb. 19, 1990) (unpublished paper, Juris-
prudence course, University of Chicago Law School, on file with author).
10. FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 130; see also ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN 28
(1985).
11. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1985) (1651).
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ment at God's promoting the Son over him is so profound that nothing could
have deterred him from continuing his defiance-"[b]etter to reign in Hell,
than serve in Heav'n" (I, 263). Then, too, Satan might not have believed
God. Punishment as deterrence presupposes a prior crime that was punished,
to serve as an example of what is in store for criminals, as well understood
by Vico, who, fifty years after the publication of Paradise Lost, grounded
his influential concept of punishment in the Greek "paradeigmata" and its
Latin translation "exempla."'' 2 Since Satan was the first criminal, he was the
first "example" of punishment. He was right that until then God had ruled
by "reputation," "consent," and "custom." God may have welcomed the op-
portunity to display his power, for Satan's exemplary punishment
strengthened God's hand: when the loyal angels saw how Satan was pun-
ished, their loyalty to God "though [already] firm, stood more confirm'd"
(XI, 71).
But God may have overlooked what criminologists call specific deter-
rence, which means deterring a particular criminal from repeating his
crime.'3 Severe as Satan's punishment was, it was not incapacitating. And
because God had not revealed to Satan how Satan's future crimes would
evoke further punishment ("[tireble confusion, wrath and vengeance" (I,
220)), Satan could, in good faith, as it were, urge the other rebel angels to
continue committing crimes against God because they should "fear no sec-
ond fate" (II, 17). Anything they did to offend God from now on would give
them pleasure not offset by fear of incremental punishment for the new of-
fense.
Not that Milton's God overlooks deterrence completely. On one occa-
sion he uses it to deter Satan. Gabriel, dispatched to guard Eden, detects
Satan lurking just outside its gate. As the two prepare to fight, Gabriel points
to God's scales of justice in the sky:
Th' Eternal to prevent such horrid fray
Hung forth in Heav'n his golden Scales,
•.. in these He put two weights
The sequel each of parting and of fight;
The latter quick up flew, and kickt the beam ....
The Fiend lookt up and knew
His mounted scale aloft: nor more; but fled
Murmuring.... (IV, 996-97, 1002-04, 1013-15)
By permitting Satan a glimpse of the movement of God's heavenly scales,
God signals the punishment that awaits Satan, and the signal deters. By
causing Satan to flinch, God achieves one of his stated objectives, which is
to erode Satan's "obdtrate pride" (I, 58).
The most difficult questions raised by the initial punishments of Satan
and the rebel angels are why God did not inform Satan and his followers of
the futility and fell consequences of rebellion, and why the punishments
12. GIAMBATTISTA Vico, THE NEW SCIENCE OF GIAMBATTISTA Vico 384 (Thomas Goddard
Bergin & Max Harold Fisch trans., unabr ed., Cornell University Press 1984) (1744).
13. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 513 (David Levinson ed., 2002).
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took so extravagantly monarchical a form. The answer to the first question
ties back to our discussion of free will. Free will is incompatible with
complete foreknowledge in the following sense: if you know exactly what
will be the consequences of a choice, the choice becomes foreordained, and
you make the choice that produces the greatest surplus of benefits over costs
(both terms are to be understood here in their broadest sense). If Satan is
deterrable, then being given full information about the future will "compel"
him to abandon thoughts of rebellion, while if he is undeterrable, giving him
full information will have no effect. God wants Satan, as he will later want
Adam, to obey not because of a calculation of where his self-interest lies,
but as a choice purified of selfish considerations.
The severity of Satan's punishment involves the following paradox:
monarchical punishment demonstrates monarchical omnipotence, and,
hence, the utter futility of resistance, but if the monarch is truly omnipotent,
there is no need to demonstrate the fact. Cruel public punishment, if instru-
mental rather than merely sadistic, is rather a sign of weakness, of anxiety,
than of strength. (Nietzsche regarded vengeance as a sign of weakness.14 )
This returns us to our earlier point that Milton's God is not really omnipo-
tent. A third of the angels rebelled with Satan; without crushing their free
will, God cannot prevent the remaining angels from likewise rebelling-and
so he has recourse to a device used by human monarchs, who aspire to and
fall short of omnipotence within their domains. But perhaps the demonstra-
tion of monarchical power is aimed at us, the readers of Paradise Lost, to
impress us with divine power, so that we will obey.
God uses, by the way, the carrot as well as the stick with the remaining
angels when he dispatches several of them to stand guard outside Hell and
Eden, even though his powers of surveillance and prevention make guardian
angels superfluous. In sending them "upon his high behests / For state, as
Sovran King, and to enure / Our prompt obedience" (VIII, 238-40), he as-
signs them an honorable office that enables them to exercise a modicum of
divine power.
The punishment of Satan, though it neither improves nor deters him, has
one effect on him: it causes him to switch tactics-with the paradoxical ef-
fect of making him more dangerous. As he explains to the other fallen
angels,
Henceforth his might we know, and know our own
So as not either to provoke, or dread
New War, provok't; our better part remains
To Work in close design, by fraud or guile
What force effected not .... (I, 643-47)
Foucault remarks upon the shift from a criminality of force to a criminality
of fraud, as methods of surveillance improve and forcible crimes become
14. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, On the Genealogy of Morals, in ON THE GENEALOGY OF MOR-
ALS AND ECCE HoMo 13, 1st essay, § 7, at 33 (Walter Kaufmann ed., Walter Kaufmann & R.J.
Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books 1989) (1887).
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more detectable. 5 Before their rebellion, Satan and his followers were un-
aware of how closely God monitored their movements. Afterwards they
remain imperfectly aware, as otherwise they would realize the futility of
further resistance.
B. The Punishment of Man: Rehabilitation and Deterrence
God's motivations in punishing humankind differ strikingly from his
motivations for punishing Satan. In punishing Adam and Eve, God cali-
brates punishment to make it both deter further disobedient acts and
rehabilitate the offenders so that they and their descendants will become
obedient subjects. We are in the presence of Foucault's corrective or utilitar-
ian model of punishment, in which the pain of punishment is set at a level
calculated to exceed the expected returns of crime, and thus deter (most)
potential offenders from committing the crime, but is not so severe (as the
death penalty would be) to preclude rehabilitation, or in religious terms,
redemption or salvation.
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As the consideration (in contract-law terminology) for creating Adam
and Eve and giving them sovereignty over Eden, God exacted only two
promises: they must tend the trees, plants, and flowers in the garden, and
they must not eat any of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and
Evil. These conditions are the two "laws," one imposing a positive obliga-
tion and the other a negative one, that they must obey.17 The positive
obligation is trivial, since Adam and Eve have nothing else to do with their
time than garden; the opportunity costs to them of light gardening are essen-
tially zero. The negative obligation is, of course, just a test, indeed a tease,
since God does not tell the couple why they shouldn't eat the fruit of that
mysteriously named tree and, more specifically, why it is a bad thing to un-
derstand good and evil. Nor does he adequately explain to them the
consequences of disobedience. He makes clear that the consequences will be
bad, but the details (such as painful childbirth and the mortality of their de-
scendants) are withheld.
The failure of notice is conspicuous, and plays into the hands of Satan; it
enables him to tell Eve that God must have been kidding when he said that
eating the forbidden fruit would be punished by death, for he (Satan in the
guise of the serpent) ate it, and he's fine (IX, 568-612). If God through his
messenger Raphael had explained the precise consequences of disobedience
(death, but not immediate death)-even more, if he had catalogued for
Adam and Eve the deceptive techniques that Satan might employ against
15. FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 77; Brittan, supra note 9, at 8; see also Armstrong, supra
note 9, at 103.
16. FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 92-94, 130-31.
17. Brittan, supra note 9, at 14; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, An Introduction to the Princi-
ples of Morals and Legislation, in A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 113, 125 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., Basil Blackwell 1960) (1789); VICTORIA




them-Eve would have been forearmed to resist. Satan further explains that
he learned to speak by eating the fruit, showing that knowledge is a good
thing to acquire. Of course in Milton's world this is a bad thing; it puts the
serpent above himself, as it were, since animals are supposed to be dumb.
There is an acute anxiety in the Bible (as in the story of the Tower of Babel)
echoed in Paradise Lost about challenges to hierarchy; it is this anxiety that
leads to exalting blind obedience as the supreme virtue of every living thing
except God himself. Though Milton had once been a rebel-or maybe be-
cause he had once been a rebel: a high official in Oliver Cromwell's regime,
who narrowly escaped execution at the Restoration-he exalts obedience
and hierarchy to a degree incomprehensible to a modem American.
As with Satan, had God been explicit with Adam and Eve, their choice
would have been foregone. Milton's Eve is intelligent. (She is supposed to
be less intelligent than Adam, yet she has an inquiring mind, and he does
not-it may be an example of Milton's happily incomplete conscious con-
trol over his poem.) Satan makes a compelling case for, as it were, the
material advantages of her eating the fruit. The case is compelling because it
is consistent with what Raphael as God's emissary had told Adam. Con-
cealment of consequences forced Eve to choose between the advantages set
out for her by Satan and her duty of obedience to God. God wants it to be a
real choice, as it would not be if Eve knew what disobedience would cost
her. Raphael is to tell Adam just enough about the gravity of disobeying
God's command to "render Man inexcusable" (, argument, 243-45).
Eve is absent during most of Raphael's discourse with Adam, leading
Raphael to tell Adam: "warn / Thy weaker" (VI, 909). Although Eve had
overheard Raphael's warning Adam about "such an Enemy we have, who
seeks / Our ruin" (IX, 274-75), she had missed the narrative of God's pun-
ishment of Satan. The result is that while Adam describes his thirst for
knowledge as having been quenched by Raphael's revelation, Eve's thirst
has not been-which makes her all the more susceptible to Satan's urging
her to eat of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil.
It seems that she is left in the dark in this way in order to double the test
of her character. For while Adam's only duty (besides gardening) is not to
eat the forbidden fruit, Eve has the further duty (though not, it seems, a
"law" in the sense that disobedience would be punished by God) of obeying
Adam. Perfect obedience would be accepting as an adequate explanation for
a command "because I say so." Eve fails that test. She wanders off against
Adam's wishes and is promptly "seduced." Even worse from the standpoint
of maintaining male authority, she eats the forbidden fruit in the belief that
acquiring knowledge will put her on a more equal footing with Adam:
[S]hall I to [Adam] make known
As yet my change, and give him to partake
Full happiness with mee, or rather not.
But keep the odds of Knowledge in my power
Without Copartner? so to add what wants
In Female Sex, the more to draw his Love,
And render me more equal, and perhaps,
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A thing not undesirable, sometime
Superior: for inferior who is free? (IX, 817-25)
If she shares her discovery with Adam and he eats the fruit, it will enable
him to reestablish his intellectual superiority, and, as she remarks in the pas-
sage we just quoted, "inferior who is free?"
Yet Adam, too, has a secondary duty, which he flunks: to control Eve.
He eats the fruit because he cannot bear to live without her. That is weak-
ness. Uxoriousness leads him into sin." The moral is that independent-
minded women and uxorious men are the ultimate source of human misery.
Adam and Eve's willful disobedience of a direct order by God is treason
(III, 207). And the punishment for treason is death.' 9 As God explains,
Man disobeying,
Disloyal breaks his fealty, and sins
Against the high Supremacy of Heav'n,
Affecting God-head, and so losing all,
To expiate his Treason hath naught left,
But to destruction sacred and devote,
He with his whole posterity must die,
Die hee or Justice must; unless for him
Some other able, and as willing, pay
The rigid satisfaction, death for death. (III, 203-12)
An added humiliation is that when Adam and Eve die, they shall, God ex-
plains, return to dust. Adam and Eve degraded themselves by disobeying
him, and their punishment degrades them to the base component from which
they were created. They will be down in the dust with the serpent.
Why their posterity must also suffer, die, turn to dust, etc., is unclear. Yet
it was common in Milton's time to punish the family of traitors by confiscat-
ing their wealth, in order to increase the severity and, hence, deterrent effect
20of punishment for this (to governments) gravest of all crimes. More impor-
tant, it is one of those undeniable facts in the Genesis narrative that Milton
as a believing Christian was constrained to accept, whether or not it made a
lot of sense to him.
But to have stopped with pronouncing Adam and Eve's disobedience
treason for which the punishment for them and their descendants is death2'
would have been to deprive man of all hope, as well as to contradict the
New Testament. The compromise that Milton-that Christianity-makes
18. LEWIS, supra note 7, at 126.
19. 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 476
(London, MacMillan 1883).
20. See LISA STEFFEN, DEFINING A BRITISH STATE: TREASON AND NATIONAL IDENTITY,
1608-1820, at 1, 10-17 (2001).
21. STEPHEN, supra note 19, at 476; see Janelle R. Greenberg & Martin S. Greenberg, Crime
and Justice in Tudor-Stuart England and the Modern United States: The More Things Change, the
More They Stay the Same, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261, 268 (1982) (explaining that in seventeenth-
century England, judges had no power to commute the sentence of death to a term of imprisonment,
but a number of loopholes allowed suspects to go free at earlier stages in the proceedings).
April 20071
Michigan Law Review
between the duty to punish traitors and the promise of redemption is a sacri-
fice designed to appease the divine wrath. The Son offers to die for man's
sin (Empson thought this an echo of human and animal sacrifice, both found
in the Old Testament 2 ), and God accepts the sacrifice. If the Son is to "re-
deem" humankind's "mortal crime," he must die a mortal death (I1, 214-15).
To justify lenience for man but not for the fallen angels, God explains
that the fallen angels
[B]y thir own suggestion fell,
Self-tempted, self-deprav'd: Man falls deceiv'd
By th' other first: Man therefore shall find grace,
The other none: in Mercy and Justice both,
Through Heav'n and Earth, so shall my glory excel,
But Mercy first and last shall brightest shine. (III, 129-34)
Calvinist moral theology dictated maximum severity of criminal sanctions,
but humaneness in their application to concrete cases. 3 And so we find a
distinction drawn in seventeenth-century thinking between punishment for
sins of willfulness and punishment for sins of infirmity.24 Though Adam and
Eve's were not mere sins of infirmity, God recognizes that-in contrast to
the fallen angels, who were "self-tempted" (another clue to Milton's austere
conception of free will)-Adam and Eve were "deceived" by a sophisticated
and wily adversary. The deception did not rob them of their free will, how-
ever. They remain culpable for their disobedience, for they knew they were
disobeying; the only effect of the deception was to exaggerate the benefits
that they could anticipate from disobedience. That is what made the decep-
tion an effective test of obedience. Without temptation, virtue does not
signify merit.
God's mercy toward Adam and Eve actually replicates an aspect of
monarchical punishment. The power to pardon for crimes is a traditional
monarchical prerogative. To repeal the criminal law on an ad hoc basis,
which is what the pardon amounts to, is as effective a demonstration of
power as drawing and quartering a traitor. The combination of savage pun-
ishment with unexpected remission is an especially powerful symbol of
power, and Milton's God, as we know, is preoccupied with demonstrating
his power.
Two of the punishments visited on Adam and Eve and their descendants
require further consideration: gender inequality and political oppression.
2 6
22. See EMPSON, supra note 1, at 241-47.
23. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT REF-
ORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 319 (2003).
24. Id. at 321.
25. Greenberg & Greenberg, supra note 21, at 270.
26. In addition to the punishment of death, God as the Son metes out the following punish-
ments to Adam and Eve, as well as to their descendants: (1) women shall receive pain in childbirth
(X, 194-96); (2) men shall rule women (X, 196); (3) human beings shall have to toil for their food
(X, 198-202); (4) they shall endure tyrants and enslavement (XII, 90-96). Although he says he will
leave it to the Son, God inflicts some additional punishments directly. He adds that (5) spring shall
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(They turn out to be connected.) God pronounces Eve's unique sentence
thus: "[T]o thy Husband's will / Thine shall submit, hee over thee shall rule"
(X, 195-196). Yet it had been made clear before the Fall that Adam and Eve
were "not equal" (IV, 296). Adam's physical appearance "declar'd / Abso-
lute rule," while Eve's appearance "impli'd / Subjection"; Adam had been
created "for God only, shee [Eve] for God in him [Adam]" (IV, 295-96,
299-301, 307-08). So what did this sentence add?
Before the Fall, God was Adam's law and Adam was Eve's law. As God
believed himself to be a benevolent sovereign, he intended Adam to be a
benevolent sovereign as well, the human hierarchy replicating the divine
one. Eve rejects hierarchy. After the Fall, when Adam reminds her that had
she not insisted on going off to do some gardening by herself he would have
protected her from temptation, Eve shoots back: "Was I to have never parted
from thy side? / As good have grown there still a lifeless Rib" (IX, 1153-
54). And to God's description of Adam and Eve's relationship as that of
head to body, Eve ripostes: "[W]hy didst not thou the Head / Command me
absolutely not to go" (IX, 1155-56). To which Adam replies: "Force upon
free Will hath here no place" (IX, 1174; emphasis added). In Eden, man
cannot force a woman to do anything against her will. But once expelled
from Eden, woman's additional punishment is subjection to man's physical
force.
Man is similarly punished by subjection to force, only the force of ty-
rants.27 After exhibiting to Adam such scenes as Cain's murder of Abel and
Nimrod's tyrannous reign, the angel Michael explains to Adam the reason
for such events:
Since thy original lapse, true Liberty
Is lost, which always with right Reason dwells
Twinn'd, and from her hath no dividual being:
Reason in man obscur'd, or not obey'd,
Immediately inordinate desires
And upstart Passions catch the Government
From Reason, and to servitude reduce
Man till then free. Therefore since hee permits
Within himself unworthy Powers to reign
Over free Reason, God in Judgment just
Subjects him from without to violent Lords;
Who oft as undeservedly enthral
His outward freedom .... (XII, 83-95)
no longer be the eternal season; seasons shall now change (X, 678-91); and (6) Adam and Eve must
leave Eden (XI, 48-49, 107-08), so that they have no opportunity to eat of the Tree of Life, live
forever, and thus foil the sentence of death (XI, 93-95).
27. XII, 93; see MICHAEL WALZER, THE REVOLUTION OF THE SAINTS: A STUDY IN THE
ORIGINS OF RADICAL POLITICs 31 (1965).
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So, for disobeying natural law/"right reason," God punishes Adam and Eve's
descendants by subjecting them to tyranny by a sovereign improperly exer-
cising his authority."
Thus Milton explains and justifies both gender subordination and politi-
cal oppression as the consequence of the Fall's having deprived man of the
ability to conform to natural law. As Eve had explained to Satan, the prohi-
bition against eating the fruit of one tree was "Sole Daughter of [God's]
voice; the rest we live / Law to ourselves, our Reason is our Law" (IX, 653-
54). "Reason is our Law" is natural law, understood by one school of Mil-
ton's contemporaries as a moral order that God had stamped into human
nature.29 In his prose work, The Christian Doctrine, Milton wrote that in
Eden "it was the disposition of man to do what was right, as a being natu-
rally good and holy."30 Made in the image of God, man had "implanted and
innate in him .. . the law of nature, which is sufficient of itself to teach
whatever is agreeable to right reason, that is to say, whatever is intrinsically
good.''D But with the Fall, human beings "lost that right reason which en-
abled man to discern the chief good. 32 As Calvin put it, the Fall created a
"second nature" of man that resists submission and strives to dominate oth-
ers. Only by finding and obeying the lost "right reason" can the human race
be redeemed.
28. This punishment takes on a poignancy in seventeenth-century England at the time Milton
was writing Paradise Lost. Charles I had been executed in 1649, eighteen years before the publica-
tion of Paradise Lost. He was considered by many, including Milton, a tyrant who had placed
himself above the law and Parliament. See CHRISTOPHER HILL, MILTON AND THE ENGLISH REVO-
LUTION 189 (1977) (noting that Milton was one of the first to appear in print to justify the trial of
Charles I). The English Calvinists, and likely Milton as well, viewed England as God's elect nation,
destined to reveal God's mission to mankind. Calvinists also believed that govemment by represen-
tative leaders of the community was superior to government by a single ruler. Harold J. Berman,
Law and Belief in Three Revolutions, 18 VAL. U. L. REV. 569, 597-98 (1984). In 1660, the son of
Charles I, Charles II, was restored to the throne of England with significant changes in the balance
of power between the King and Parliament; absolute monarchy was no more. In the English Calvin-
ists' view, the people of England, as the elect descendants of Adam and Eve, were obeying their
right reason and moving in the path of redemption. See HILL, supra note 4, at 310 (explaining the
centrality of the Fall to seventeenth-century thinking about politics, and to Milton's thinking about
the question of an individual's freedom in relation to the authority of the state).
29. RHETORIC AND LAW IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 7 (Victoria Kahn & Loma Hutson eds.,
2001), citing JOHANN SOMMERVILLE, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN ENGLAND, 1603-1640, at 15
(1986). Other writers had a different view of natural law. Hobbes essentially viewed government as
an entirely human affair and reduced natural law to the sovereign's will. See MATTHEW JORDAN,
MILTON AND MODERNITY 10 (2001); cf. KAHN, supra note 17, at 34 (noting the influence on Milton
of Grotius' social-contract view of natural law).
30. JOHN MILTON, THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE (Charles R. Sumner trans., Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 1825) (n.d.), reprinted in JOHN MILTON: COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE 993
(Meritt Y Hughes ed., 1985).
31. Id.
32. JOHN MILTON, THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE (n.d.), reprinted in 15 THE WORKS OF JOHN
MILTON 207 (James Holly Hanford & Waldo Hilary Dunn eds. & Charles R. Sumner trans., Colum-
bia University Press 1933).
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C. The Punishment ofAnimals:
Strict Liability and Gratuitous Punishment
The logic of punishment in Paradise Lost breaks down when it comes to
the fate of animals. The reason is Milton's commitment to the historical ac-
curacy of the Bible and his awareness of the brute facts of life.
We should distinguish, however, between the punishment of the serpent
(condemned to crawl on its belly) and that of the other animals, especially
those who upon expulsion from Eden become prey rather than predators,
though of course most predators are the prey of other animals. In the Bible
the serpent is properly punished because he is the tempter; he is not a tool of
Satan, who barely figures in the Old Testament. In Paradise Lost, however,
the serpent is the unwitting tool of Satan. Remember that the serpent was
innocently asleep when Satan entered his mouth and took control of him
(IX, 187-88). Satan chose the serpent because the serpent was the most in-
telligent animal, and therefore unlikely to arouse Eve's suspicions when he
turned out, unlike the other animals, to be able to speak. When the tempta-
tion of Eve is complete, Satan abandons the serpent, who presumably
awakes eventually with no sense of the use that had been made of him. Why
then is he condemned to crawl on his belly? There is no answer except that
Genesis said that he was punished and Milton cannot, without courting a
charge of heresy, flatly contradict a factual claim made in the Bible. He can-
not speculate that the Bible story is based on male fears of seduction
symbolized by the temptation of Eve by an animal that resembles a phallus.
What is true, though unremarked in the poem, is that there are strict liability
crimes and, more to the point, that our moral condemnations are not limited
to acts motivated by an evil design. The classic case is that of Oedipus, who
is depicted as having done terrible wrongs in killing his father and marrying
his mother-wrongs that require that he be punished by blinding and ex-
ile-even though he neither believed nor had reason to believe that he had
committed parricide and incest. And so it is with the unfortunate serpent. Its
innocent but deadly role in the Fall of man demanded punishment.
The same cannot be said for the rabbits, deer, mice, and countless other
vegetarian animals who upon the Fall of man become prey. They had noth-
ing to do with the Fall. But there is the brute fact that animals eat each other.
Milton can no more deny this than he can deny the punishment of the ser-
pent reported in the Bible or the punishments seemingly superfluously
added by God to the basic punishment of making man mortal (tyranny, cold
winter and hot summer, expulsion from Eden, etc.).33 But no penal theory
expressed or implied in the poem can explain the punishment of those ani-
mals who, unlike the serpent, have no causal relation to (let alone moral
responsibility for) the Fall.
33. The notion that they have to be expelled because otherwise they would eat of the Tree of
Life and thus cancel God's death sentence is unconvincing, since God could simply have destroyed
or removed the tree.
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This may seem a minor failing, a peripheral inconsistency, as "animal
rights" was not a burning issue in Milton's day. But actually it is central to
the poem's failure-not as a poem, but as a theodicy-to justify the divine
punishment that the poem narrates and defends. For it highlights the brutal
excess of punishment everywhere evident in the poem. Even the rebellion
by Satan and his followers seems punished excessively, for the rebels' utter
impotence in the face of the power of the Father and the Son ensured that
the rebellion would have little consequence. Why not just incapacitate Satan
and the fallen angels in Hell rather than subject them to "torture without
end"? (I, 67). The punishment of Adam and Eve's descendants-the whole
of mankind-seems especially gratuitous given the incentives that the ex-
pulsion from Eden created for faith and obedience. Adam and Eve surely
learned their lesson; why could they not be trusted to pass it on to their de-
scendants? And the punishment of the animals has not even a concept of
hereditary taint to commend it, since the animals, with the very dubious ex-
ception of the serpent, committed no wrong. In Milton's theodicy, God's
divine punishment bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the penal prac-
tices of ruthless and insecure secular human monarchs.
